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ABSTRACT
In the Design By Contract (DBC) approach, programmers
specify methods with pre and postconditions (also called
contracts). Earlier work added protocols to the DBC ap-
proach to describe allowed method call sequences for classes.
We extend this work to deal with a variant of generic classes
and multithreaded classes. We present the semantical foun-
dations of our extension. We describe a new technique to
check that method contracts are correct w.r.t. to protocols.
We show how to generate programs that must be proven
to show that method contracts are correct w.r.t. to proto-
cols. Because little support currently exists to help writ-
ing method contracts, our technique helps programmers to
check their contracts early in the development process.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.1 [Software Engineering]: Requirements/Specifications;
D.2.5 [Software Engineering]: Testing and Debugging
Keywords
Protocols, Multithreading, Object-Orientation, Design By
Contract.
1. Introduction
Over the last years, major work has been done towards
software verification. Among the variety of methods to ver-
ify software, a method of major importance is Design By
Contract (DBC) [1]. In the DBC approach, programmers
specify methods with pre and postconditions (also called
contracts). A precondition specifies what the client must
provide at method entry, while a postcondition specifies
what is ensured to the client at method exit. Tools for DBC
include the Eiffel programming language [2], the Java Mod-
eling Language (JML) [3] for Java, and the Spec# project
for C# [4].
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The aforementioned techniques for DBC both provide tool
support to (1) dynamically check contracts (with Eiffel’s
built-in facilities or with JML’s runtime assertion checker [5])
and (2) statically check contracts (with ESC/Java2 [6] for
JML or with Boogie [7] for Spec#).
Typically, the DBC approach recommends to write method
contracts before implementing the methods. The tools men-
tioned above, however, are useful to check implementation of
methods against their contracts: In the typical development
process outlined above, the feedback from static checking
tools comes very late in the development process. In this
paper, we propose a technique to use static checking earlier
in the development process. To do this, we extend earlier
work on specifying method call sequences in JML [8].
A method call sequence is a regular expression indicating
what methods can be called on an object and in which or-
der methods must be called. As explained earlier [8], many
classes must be used in a specific way by clients: for these
classes it is important to be able to concisely express allowed
method call sequences. For example, clients of Java’s inter-
face StreamBuffer must call method read() zero or more
time and then call method close() once [9]. This can be
concisely specified with the following method call sequence:
read()*, close() (1)
In this paper, we extend [8] to deal with a variant of
generic classes and multithreaded classes (i.e., classes such
that multiple methods can safely execute in parallel on in-
stances of these classes). We extend the specification lan-
guage and the semantical foundations of the work mentioned
above. We maintain [8]’s spirit by providing a concise and
intuitive regular expression-like notation to write protocols
of multithreaded programs.
In addition, we provide a technique to check if method
contracts are correct w.r.t. to protocols. For example, given
the protocol (1) above, a programmer has to make sure that
1) read()’s postcondition implies reads’s precondition (be-
cause read can be called multiple times successively) and
(2) read()’s postcondition implies close()’s precondition
(because close is called after read). If one of the condi-
tions above does not hold, some programs, even if they obey
StreamBuffer’s protocols, will fail to verify. We formalize
this intuition by saying that method contracts should adhere
to protocols. We describe how to generate programs that
must be proven to show that method contracts adhere to
protocols.
This technique can be applied early in the development
process because it only require methods to be specified with
contracts (not necessarily to be implemented), providing
feedback to programmers early in the development process.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 informally
introduces our model language, Section 3 formally defines
our language for specifying protocols, Section 4 presents an
example of writing protocols in our language, Section 5 de-
fines the semantics of multithreaded programs and the se-
mantics of protocols, Section 6 shows how we generate pro-
grams that must be proven to show that method contracts
adhere to protocols, Section 7 evaluates our approach and
discusses its limitations, Section 8 describes related work
and Section 9 concludes.
2. The Model Language
Model language similar to ours can be found in other
works [10, 11].Our model language is a Java-like language
where programmers specify methods with pre and postcon-
ditions (also called contracts) à la JML [3]. A precondi-
tion specifies what the client must provide at method entry,
while a postcondition specifies what is ensured to the client
at method exit. Contracts are specified using permission-
accounting separation logic [12, 13].
Our model language features class parametrized by spec-
ification values. Specifications values include client-defined
objects, permissions and built-in Java values (objects, inte-
gers, booleans, etc.). This allows classes to express different
behaviors without code duplication.
3. The Protocol Language
Protocols are specified with the following grammar:
n ∈ N integers
q ∈ Q rationals
v ∈ ProtVar protocol variables
α ∈ LogVar logical variables (generic parameters)
op ∈ Operator ::= { == ,!, < , <= , + , . . . }
e ∈ Expr ::= true | false | n | q
e op e | π | v | α
m ∈ Method T ∈ Type
s ∈ Spec ::= m(T̄) | v = m(T̄) |
s, s | s | s |
s? | s* | s+ |
e ? s : s | s || s | !<n> s
Our specification language consists in specifications for
methods, sequential composition of specifications, composi-
tion of specifications with regular expression-like notations,
conditional specifications, and parallel composition of spec-
ifications.
Now, we describe the meaning of specifications, m(T̄) de-
notes m’s execution, v = m(T̄) denotes m’s execution where
m’s return value is stored in v. Types T̄ are used to choose
an implementation of m in the case where m is overloaded.
s, s′ denotes the sequential composition of s and s′, s | s′
denotes s or s′, e ? s : s′ denotes s if e is true (s′ otherwise),
s? denotes s zero or one time, s* denotes s zero or many
times, s+ denotes s one or many times, s || s′ denotes s
in parallel with s′ (heterogeneous parallelism), and !<n> s
denotes one to n s in parallel (homogeneous parallelism).
Protocols can depend on class parameters in the case
e ? s : s. This permits to adapt protocols to the differ-
ent behaviors of a class. For simplicity, we do not include a
conditional without “else” branch even if we use it in later
examples. We could include it without any complication.
Compared to [8], we do not allow to specify nested call
sequences. This forbids to specify that, for example, given
two methods m and n, m should call n. We do not con-
sider this as a limitation since our goal is different from the
cited work. We focus on public protocols (protocols that
are used by clients), because checking adherence of method
contracts to protocols (see Section 6) is useful only for pub-
lic protocols, whereas nested call sequences are useful only
for private protocols (protocols that are used by class imple-
menters). Contrary to [8], we introduce protocol variables
(case v = m(T̄)), we allow to specify optional protocols (case
s?), to specify conditionals (case e ? s : s), and to specify
parallelism (cases s || s, and !<n> s).
4. Examples
4.1 Iterator Example:
To illustrate our approach of specifying protocols, we use
Java’s Iterator interface:
interface Iterator {
boolean hasNext();
Object next();
void remove();
}
Clients of interface Iterator must follow a precise proto-
col. In Java’s documentation this protocol’s description is
spread among the documentation of the three methods of
interface Iterator [9].
Intuitively, Java’s documentation specifies that hasNext()
must be called first, then next() should be called if hasNext()
returned true before, and then remove() may be called if the
iterator is read-write (it can read and write to the iteratee),
and so on. To express that iterators may have write-access
to the iteratee, we parametrize interface Iterator by a per-
mission p [11]. If p is instantiated by 1, one obtains a read-
write iterator, otherwise a read-only iterator. Now, one can
can precisely and concisely express Iterator’s protocol as
follows:
(v=hasNext(), v?(next(), p==1?(remove()?)))*;
We believe that such a formal specification (compared to
Java’s informal documentation) would help clients to use
Iterators in a disciplined way.
4.2 Roster Example
Our second example is a Roster interface that collects
student identifiers and associates them with grades which
we borrow from [11].
interface Roster {
void updateGrade(int id, int grade);
boolean contains(int id);
}
For performance issues, we want implementers of the Roster
interface to allow (1) multiple threads to concurrently read
a roster and (2) a thread to update the grades while an-
other threads concurrently read the student identifiers. This
can be specified with the following protocol (where the un-
parametrized ! is desugared to !<232>):
(updateGrade(int,int) || (!contains(int)))*;
5. Semantics
5.1 Semantics of Multithreaded Programs
The semantics of multithreaded programs is defined in
terms of actions, ghost stores, and traces. An action is either
method entering or method exiting. Ghost stores keep track
of generic parameters (encoded as final ghost fields) and pro-
tocol variables (encoded as normal ghost fields). Generic
parameters are final: they are assigned only once (at object
creation) while protocol variables are assigned each time
the corresponding method is called. For example, in the
Iterator’s protocol, the protocol variable v (represented
by the ghost field v) is assigned each time hasNext() is
called. Ghost stores map logical variables (generic parame-
ters) and protocol variables to specification values (permis-
sions, client-defined values and Java built-in values). Fi-
nally, a trace is a sequence of ghost stores and actions.
a ∈ Action ::= m.enter(T̄ ) | m.exit(T̄ )
σ ∈ GhostStore ::= (LogVar ∪ ProtVar) ⇀ SpecVal
τ ∈ Trace ::= GhostStore× Action
We write a τ for the concatenation of action a and trace τ ,
τ τ ′ for the concatenation of trace τ and trace τ ′, and ε for
the empty sequence or trace. Note that, given the execution
of a multithreaded program, we do not distinguish between
actions from different threads. All actions of all threads
form a single trace. This suffices to express the semantics of
protocols.
We omit the operational semantics of our model language.
It is completely standard except that 1) we extend object
stores with ghost stores (2) ghost stores are updated when
methods that assign protocol variables are called. Because
the operational semantics does not depend on ghost stores
(ghost stores are written but never read), there is a trivial
erasure to Java’s operational semantics.
5.2 Semantics of Protocols
The semantics of protocols is given by JK : Spec →
GhostStore → 2Action. Intuitively, JsK(σ) returns the set of all
possible traces that satisfy s w.r.t. σ. For the cases different
from e ? s : s, s || s, and !<n> s, JK’s definition is standard:
Jm(T̄)K(σ σ′) ∆= {m.enter(T̄ ) m.exit(T̄ )}
Jv = m(T̄)K(σ σ′) ∆= {m.enter(T̄ ) m.exit(T̄ )}
Js, s′ K(σ) ∆= {a a′
˛̨̨̨
˛̨ a ∈ JsK(σ0)a′ ∈ Js′ K(σ1)
σ0 σ1 = σ
}
Js | s′ K(σ) ∆= JsK(σ) ∪ Js′ K(σ)
Js?K(σ) ∆= {ε} ∪ JsK(σ)
Js*K(σ) ∆=
S
i∈N JsK
i(σ)
Js+K(σ) ∆=
S
i∈N+JsK
i(σ)
and JsKn(σ) is defined as follows:
JsK0(ε) ∆= {ε}
JsKi(σ) ∆= {a a′
˛̨̨̨
˛̨ a ∈ JsK(σ0)a′ ∈ JsKi−1(σ1)
σ0 σ1 = σ
}
Below, we write (||) : Expr → State → {⊥,>} to denote
the (standard and omitted) semantics of expressions and we
write fst(σ) to denote the first ghost store of a sequence of
ghost stores:
Je ? s : s′ K(σ) ∆=

JsK(σ) iff (|e |)(fst(σ)) = >
Js′ K(σ) otherwise
To define the cases s || s and !<n> s of the semantics of
specifications, we define the interleaving of two sequences of
actions with ! : Action× Action → 2Action:
ε ! a ∆= {a}
a ! ε ∆= {a}
a a ! a′ a′ ∆=
{a a′′ | a′′ ∈ a ! a′ a′}
∪
{a′ a′′ | a′′ ∈ a a ! a′}
The ! operator is extended to sets of sequences (! :
2Action × 2Action → 2Action) in the straightforward way. Then,
we can define:
Js || s′ K(σ) ∆= JsK(σ) ! Js′ K(σ)
J!<n> sK(σ) ∆=
S
i∈{1,2,...,n} ||
i s(σ)
where ||i : Spec → 2Action is defined as follows:
||1 s(σ)
∆
= JsK(σ)
||i s(σ)
∆
= JsK(σ) ! (||i−1 s(σ)) (for i ≥ 2)
5.3 Satisfaction of Traces w.r.t. Protocols
A trace satisfies a protocol if its underlying sequence of
actions is the prefix of one of the sequences denoted by the
protocol. We use the prefix of one of the sequences denoted
by the protocol because we consider that not terminating a
protocol is harmless. Formally:
(σ0, a0) . . . (σn, an) ` s iff a0 . . . an |= JsK(σ0 . . . σn)
a0 . . . an |= JsK(σ0 . . . σn)
iff
(∃ a σ)(a0 . . . an a ∈ JsK(σ0 . . . σn σ))
6. Adherence of Method Contracts to
Protocols
To help programmers check that method contracts ad-
here to protocols, we generate programs. Then, generated
programs must be proven to show that method contracts ad-
here to protocols. If generated programs cannot be proven,
method contracts are incorrect w.r.t. to protocols: some
(client-provided) programs will fail to verify.
When generating programs, we cannot (easily) provide
method parameters fulfilling the part of method precondi-
tions relevant to method parameters. Therefore, our tech-
nique is restricted to methods whose precondition has the
form F op G (where op = {*, & }) and no method parame-
ter (except this and result) occurs in F . Later, we refer to
this restriction by saying that method preconditions must be
receiver splittable. Because of this restriction, we can syntac-
tically split method contracts into a part that concerns the
receiver this (F ) and a part that concerns the parameters
(G). Then, when checking adherence of protocols, the part
of the preconditions relevant to parameters (G) is dropped.
We believe that, in practice, most method preconditions are
receiver splittable. Our belief is supported by the fact that
requires i.init * Perm(i.v,1);
ensures true;
void checkAdherence(Iterator<p> i){
... // initialization (not shown in the interface)
boolean b = havoc(boolean);
while(b){
i.v = hasNext();
boolean b0 = havoc(boolean);
if(b0){
assume(i.v); Object o = i.next();
boolean b1 = havoc(boolean);
if(b1){ assume(i.p==1); i.remove(); }
}}
}
Figure 2: Checking Iterator’s Protocol
all examples from [10] and [14](i.e., 14 classes) are receiver
spittable [15] (it should be noted though, that our study
is limited since the literature on object oriented separation
logic is scarce).
Figure 1 shows the rules for generating programs. Func-
tion gen(r, s, T ) generates the program to be proven to show
that method contracts of class T adhere to protocol s given
that the object considered is r. Intuitively, gen(r, s, T ) gen-
erates the automaton corresponding to protocol s. In the
cases m(T̄ ′) and v = m(T̄ ′), “unknown parameters” (pa-
rameters about which nothing is known) are passed to m.
Unknown objects are axiomatized by using havoc() meth-
ods whose preconditions and postconditions are simply true.
In practice, we use one havoc() method per type. Because
we restrict to methods whose preconditions are receiver split-
table, it is correct to use unknown parameters (recall that the
parameter-relevant part of preconditions is discarded when
checking adherence). We use havoc(boolean) statements to
model non-deterministic choice. À la JML, we use assume
statements to give hints to the verification system when gen-
erating the program corresponding to a conditional protocol
(case e ? s : s). We cannot use Java’s if statement directly
because expressions occurring in conditional protocols are
not valid Java expressions (they can refer to ghost fields).
Because protocols can model multithreaded programs,
gen(r, s, T ) can also generate custom classes extending Thread
(see cases s || s′ and !<n> s and the function classgen(C, s, T )).
Generated classes are called from the generated program. In
generated classes the receiver is stored in the field rec. Note
that pre and postconditions of the run method of generated
classes should be fulfilled manually.
By a proof by induction over s’s structure, we showed
that our technique is sound in the sense that it does not
produce false positives. If a generated program cannot be
proven, then either the verification technique is too weak or
method contracts do not adhere to the protocol considered.
In both cases, some (client-provided) programs will fail to
verify (even if they obey the order on method calls induced
by the protocol).
Example of the Iterator interface.
To check that method contracts of the Iterator inter-
face adhere to interface Iterator’s protocol (shown in Sec-
tion 4), one has to verify the method shown in Figure 2.
The method’s precondition is i.init because our model lan-
guage does not have constructors and init is a special pred-
icate that is obtained after object creation. The predicate
Perm(i.v,1) represents the permissions to read/write the
extra ghost field added for expressing Iterator’s protocol.
Note that ghost fields are usually not allowed in interfaces
[3]. For simplicity, we allow to use ghost fields in interfaces
because, when checking adherence, we can consider inter-
faces as classes (we only use method contracts, not method
implementations).
The program shown in Figure 2 can be verified with stan-
dard (pen and paper) techniques for verifying object-oriented
programs annotated with our flavor of separation logic [10,
11].
Implementation.
We implemented the set of rules shown in Figure 1. Our
implementation, examples of protocols and proofs of the cor-
responding generated programs are available [15].
7. Evaluation and Limitations
Previous work [8] already showed the usefulness of specify-
ing protocols of sequential classes. Because we extend [8] to
deal with protocol variables and a variant of generic classes,
some sequential classes whose protocol cannot be precisely
expressed with [8]’s language can now be expressed (as the
Iterator example). We evaluated the usefulness of our
extension for multithreaded classes: we found that that
immutable classes, temporarily immutable classes (classes
whose instances alternate between being written by a sin-
gle thread and read by multiple threads), and classes which
allow multiple methods to execute in parallel on single in-
stances of these classes (like the Roster example) can be
specified with our protocols [15].
Among other examples, we evaluated our technique of
checking adherence of contracts while we were trying to
prove an implementation of the Iterator interface [11]. We
found that, without the systematic approach of checking
the adherence of method contracts to protocols, it was time-
consuming to find the right way to write specifications. Other
examples are available [15].
8. Related Work and Future Work
Design by Contract (DBC) was first introduced by Meyer[2]
in the Eiffel programming language. Eiffel features method
contracts, invariants, and built-in facilities to dynamically
check contracts. Eiffel does not support protocols and there
is no tool to statically check properties of Eiffel programs.
Support for DBC in Java is provided by several tools in-
cluding JML [3], Jass [16], and ESC/Java2 [6]. The earlier
work of Cheon and Perumandla [8] to provide method call
specifications in JML greatly inspired our work. Jass per-
mits to specify protocols in the style of CSP. Both the work
of Cheon and Perumandla and Jass support dynamic check-
ing of protocols. We do not provide an implementation for
dynamically checking protocols but our goal is different: we
use protocols to statically check adherence of method con-
tracts to protocols. ESC/Java2 permits to statically check
many properties of Java programs. It does not support pro-
tocols.
Support for DBC in C# is provided by Spec# [4] and
Boogie [7]. There is no support for protocols.
Separation logic [12] has been adapted to a sequential
Java-like setting by Parkinson [10]. Later Parkinson’s work
has been extended to support fork/join parallelism [11]. The
gen(r, m(T0, . . . , Tn), T )
∆
= T ′′o = r.m(havoc(T0), . . . , havoc(Tn))
gen(r, v = m(T0, . . . , Tn), T )
∆
= T ′′o = r.v = m(havoc(T0), . . . , havoc(Tn))
gen(r, s, s′, T )
∆
= gen(r, s, T );gen(r, s′, T )
gen(r, s | s′, T )
∆
= boolean b = havoc(boolean); if(b){gen(r, s, T )}else{gen(r, s′, T )}
gen(r, s?, T )
∆
= boolean b = havoc(boolean); if(b){gen(r, s, T )}
gen(r, s*, T )
∆
= boolean b = havoc(boolean); while(b){gen(r, s, T )}
gen(r, s+, T )
∆
= gen(r, s, T ); boolean b = havoc(boolean); while(b){gen(r, s, T )}
gen(r, e ? s : s′, T )
∆
= boolean b = havoc(boolean);
if(b){assume(e);gen(r, s, T )}else{assume(!e);gen(r, s′, T )}
gen(r, s || s′, T )
∆
= ThreadS tS=new ThreadS(r); ThreadSp tSp=new ThreadSp(r);
tS.start(); tSp.start(); tS.join(); tSp.join()
Class ThreadS is classgen(ThreadS, s, T ) and Class ThreadSp is classgen(ThreadSp, s′, T )
gen(r, !<n> s, T )
∆
= ThreadS[] at=new ThreadS[n]; int i; while(i<n){at[i]=new ThreadS(r);i++;}
i=0; while(i<n){at[i].start();i++;}; i=0; while(i<n){at[i].join();i++;}
Class ThreadS is classgen(ThreadS, s, T )
classgen(C, s, T )
∆
= class C extends Thread{T rec; ... // initialization
requires ?;ensures ?; void run(){gen(rec, s, T )}}
Convention: (1) In the first two cases, T ′′ is m’s return type (2) All introduced names are fresh.
Figure 1: Program Generation to Check Adherence of Contracts to Protocol s of receiver r of Class T
works cited focused on foundational issues and no support
for protocols is provided.
Future work includes the implementation of a runtime
checker to check (dynamically) that programs respect their
protocols. For this, we need to adapt the technique outlined
in [8]. In a nutshell, it would be necessary to (1) add the
appropriate ghost fields to classes, (2) synchronize access to
the executable representation of specifications (i.e., automa-
tons) and (3) extend automatons generation with the new
cases of our specification language.
We did not mentioned inheritance earlier in the paper
because it is unproblematic. As in the previous work on
method call sequences [8] a straightforward interpretation of
protocols inheritance is to conjoin inherited protocols to the
protocols declared in the inheriting class. This means that
a class has to respect inherited protocols (possibly ignoring
methods that are declared in this class) and has to respect
its own protocols. In addition, an inheriting class does not
need to check adherence of its contract w.r.t. to inherited
protocols: checking adherence of the class’s protocol against
the class’s own method contracts is sufficient.
Finally, future work includes studying how to weaken the
receiver splittable restriction mentioned in Section 6 for check-
ing adherence.
9. Conclusion
We provide a concise and intuitive regular expression-like
notation to specify protocols of multithreaded Java-like pro-
grams that use a variant of generic classes. We present the
semantical foundations of our specification language.
We show a new technique to check that method contracts
are correct w.r.t. to protocols. For this, we generate pro-
grams that must be proven to show the method contracts
are correct w.r.t. to protocols. The program generator has
been implemented.
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